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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKAY, Circuit Judge. 
 
The standing trustee in this matter, Appellant James J. 
Cain, appeals from a district court order which reversed a 
bankruptcy court award of final compensation in the 
amount of $184,888.25 and $999.40 in costs. Based on the 
language of 11 U.S.C. S 326(a), the district court held that 
the trustee should not have received compensation based 
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on a $7,781,200.00 credit bid sale. The district court also 
determined that the bankruptcy court erred in considering 
factors other than those enumerated in 11 U.S.C.S 330(a) 
in determining the trustee's fee. The trustee argues that the 
district court's interpretation of S 326(a) was improper and 
that the determination of a fee award is not limited to the 
factors enumerated in S 330(a). Consequently, the trustee 
urges us to reinstate the bankruptcy court's fee 
determination. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. SS 158(d) and 1291. 
 
I. 
 
The debtor, Lan Associates XI, L.P., commenced this 
action on July 6, 1992, by filing a voluntary petition under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Mr. Cain was 
subsequently appointed as Chapter 11 trustee. The debtor's 
principal asset was a parcel of property consisting of two 
office complexes in Marlton, New Jersey, which was subject 
to a mortgage in favor of First Fidelity Bank, N.A. Although 
the debtor initially valued the property at $9,000,000.00, it 
was later appraised at a fair market value of $9,727,000.00 
with a liquidation value of $7,781,200.00. During the 
bankruptcy proceedings, First Fidelity asserted a secured 
claim of $12,865,434.55. 
 
Pursuant to the Chapter 11 proceedings, the trustee 
acted as landlord for the office complexes for eighteen 
months. Accordingly, by Order dated April 8, 1993, the 
trustee was awarded interim compensation of $28,665.51 
based on disbursements of $949,183.54. Because the 
trustee had rendered approximately 163.5 hours of service 
as of the date of that award, his compensation as Chapter 
11 trustee amounted to approximately $175.00 per hour. 
 
On May 21, 1993, the Chapter 11 proceeding was 
converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding and Mr. Cain was 
reappointed as Chapter 7 trustee. Although the trustee 
alleged that he was prepared simply to abandon the 
property and allow First Fidelity to foreclose on it, First 
Fidelity offered to purchase the property through a credit 
bid at the liquidation price of $7,781,200.00.1 In connection 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes secured creditors to 
purchase property through credit bids. See 11 U.S.C. S 363(k) (stating 
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with the purchase, First Fidelity offered to allow the trustee 
to retain $372,387.00 from the cash collateral provided to 
the trustee by First Fidelity to cover administrative 
expenses and provide a distribution for unsecured creditors.2 
First Fidelity also offered to waive any deficiency claim it 
had remaining against the estate after the sale. 
 
In response to First Fidelity's credit bid offer, the trustee 
filed a motion and a certificate in support of the motion to 
sell the property at a private sale. See J.A. at 76-85. The 
certificate itemized the anticipated administrative expenses 
of the sale, including the trustee's anticipated commission 
of $233,616.00 based on the total sale price of 
$7,781,200.00 and an additional $70,000.00 in 
commissions based on rents received for the property. The 
certificate also referred to the $372,387.00 in cash 
collateral which First Fidelity agreed the trustee could 
retain for payment of administrative expenses and 
distribution to unsecured creditors and indicated that the 
remaining $7,408,813.00 of the sale price would be applied 
to the mortgage. See id. at 80. The trustee further explained 
in the certificate that he agreed to contribute $83,346.00 
out of his anticipated compensation to provide a 
distribution for the unsecured creditors. According to the 
trustee, once the administrative expenses were paid, 
$62,500.39 would remain for the unsecured creditors, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that at a sale "of property that is subject to a lien that secures an 
allowed claim, . . . the holder of such claim may bid at such sale, and, 
if the holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder may 
offset such claim against the purchase price of such property"). 
 
2. We think the record is fairly clear that the $372,387.00 was part of 
the total purchase price, rather than an amount over and above the 
purchase price. See J.A. at 80 (indicating that $7,408,813.00 of 
purchase price would go to mortgage and $372,387.00 would go to an 
"[a]llocation [f]or [e]xpense[s] [a]nd [c]reditors"); id. at 98 (Trustee's 
Deed 
stating total sale price as $7,781,200.00). Nonetheless, the United States 
Trustee displays some confusion on the matter. See Appellee's Br. at 6 
n.2. The bankruptcy court will need to resolve this matter on remand. In 
any event, both the district court and the U.S. Trustee indicate that the 
$372,387.00 may be counted as part of the trustee's compensation base. 
See In re Lan Assocs. XI, L.P., No. CIV. A. 98-2286, 1998 WL 467100, at 
*8 n.8 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 1998); Appellee's Br. at 6 n.2. 
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which would amount to "a distribution of approximately 
25%" of the $250,000.00 in unsecured claims. Id. 
 
To prepare for the sale, the trustee forwarded a Notice of 
Private Sale to all creditors and parties in interest, 
including the United States Trustee, Appellee in this action. 
The notice stated that the sale was to be "free and clear of 
all liens." Id. at 88. Although the bankruptcy court received 
an objection to the sale from one creditor, the court 
approved the sale by Order dated February 14, 1994, see 
id. at 92, and the sale took place on April 18, 1994. 
 
In October 1994, the trustee filed an interim application 
for an additional $204,522.76 in commissions and $999.40 
in expenses. See id. at 106, 109. To calculate the amount 
of the commissions, the trustee first added the 
$7,781,200.00 from the credit bid sale to $2,763,942.42 in 
operating revenues from the property. He then requested 
$316,534.27 in compensation based on the maximum 
percentages set forth in 11 U.S.C. S 326(a). See id. at 113. 
From this amount, the trustee subtracted the $28,665.51 
he previously had received in interim compensation and the 
$83,346.00 which he had agreed to contribute to the 
unsecured creditors, which resulted in an amount of 
$204,522.76. 
 
Having received no objection to the interim fee 
application, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the 
application on December 1, 1994. At the hearing,"the court 
questioned the amount of the trustee's commission, as it 
translated into an hourly rate, and questioned the amount 
of the distribution intended for unsecured creditors." 
Attach. to Appellant's Br. (Bankr. Ct. Op. at 7 (footnote 
omitted)). However, no one raised the issue of whether the 
credit bid could be included in the base on which the 
trustee's fee was calculated at the hearing. See id. (Bankr. 
Ct. Op. at 8). The bankruptcy court approved the trustee's 
application by Order filed December 2, 1994, see J.A. at 
159, and he was paid on December 6, 1994. See Attach. to 
Appellant's Br. (Bankr. Ct. Op. at 8). 
 
On April 17, 1995, the trustee sought authorization to 
make an interim distribution to the unsecured creditors in 
the amount of $62,500.39. Because the unsecured claims 
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which remained outstanding amounted to $328,538.03, 
this payment amounted to only a 19% dividend to the 
unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy court approved the 
distribution without objection, and the payments were 
made on May 15, 1995. See id. 
 
On November 13, 1995, the trustee submitted a final 
report to the bankruptcy court. See J.A. at 173. In the 
report, the trustee sought confirmation for the two prior 
interim payments he had received, but he did not seek 
additional compensation. One year later, on November 13, 
1996, the U.S. Trustee submitted an objection to thefinal 
report. See id. at 226. The U.S. Trustee argued that the 
amount of the credit bid was improperly included in the 
base on which the trustee's compensation was calculated, 
and as a result, the trustee had been overpaid by  
$142,449.40.3 The U.S. Trustee requested the court to 
order the trustee to disgorge this amount with interest and 
to disburse the disgorged funds to the unsecured creditors. 
 
Following a hearing on December 12, 1996, the 
bankruptcy court approved the trustee's final report and 
ordered final compensation in the amount of $184,888.25 
and $999.40 in costs. See Attach. to Appellant's Br. (Bankr. 
Ct. Order at 2). Because the trustee had anticipated a 25% 
dividend to the unsecured creditors but, in fact, provided 
only a 19% dividend, the court ordered the trustee to 
disgorge an additional 6% dividend of $19,634.51. 4 In 
making its determination, the bankruptcy court first 
reviewed the language of S 326(a) and the relevant case law 
and concluded "that under the limited circumstances here, 
where the secured creditor has consented to the 
arrangement, and where the unsecured creditors are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. According to the U.S. Trustee, the trustee collected $1,333,503.14 as 
Chapter 11 trustee, and $1,679,079.80 as Chapter 7 trustee. Based on 
these amounts, the U.S. Trustee argued that the maximum amount of 
commissions to which the trustee was entitled was $90,738.87. See J.A. 
at 235. 
 
4. The bankruptcy court rejected the trustee's arguments that the U.S. 
Trustee was estopped from challenging the compensation award based 
on principles of collateral estoppel, equitable estoppel, and laches. The 
parties did not challenge these rulings before the district court, nor do 
they raise them in this appeal. 
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receiving some benefit from the transfer, the trustee may 
base commissions on the total purchase price of the asset 
transferred, including the credit bid of the 
purchaser/lienholder." Id. (Bankr. Ct. Op. at 17). The court 
then conducted a reasonableness assessment of the 
amount of the award pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 330(a). 
Because "both a percentage-based calculation and a 
reasonableness analysis" must be conducted in establishing 
an appropriate award, id. (Bankr. Ct. Op. at 31), the 
bankruptcy court initially considered the amount of the 
requested award in relation to the maximum percentage set 
forth in S 326(a). It then examined the factors enumerated 
in S 330(a)(1) and concluded that the amount requested by 
the trustee was reasonable. Finally, although the court 
noted that its reasonableness assessment was "based on 
the statutorily articulated factors," id. (Bankr. Ct. Op. at 
33), it 
 
       readily acknowledge[d] that [it was] influenced . . . by 
       the procedural history of this case, including four 
       notices to the [U.S. Trustee] of the contemplated 
       compensation, the timing of the first objection by the 
       [U.S. Trustee], nearly two years after the award was 
       entered and paid, and the potential for hardship to the 
       trustee in the event that substantial disgorgement 
       [was] required. 
 
Id. (Bankr. Ct. Op. at 33-34). 
 
The U.S. Trustee appealed the bankruptcy court's fee 
award to the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey which reversed the bankruptcy court's decision 
and remanded for a new determination of the trustee's 
compensation. See In re Lan Assocs. XI, L.P., No. CIV. A. 
98-2286, 1998 WL 467100, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 1998). 
Noting that "[t]here is no ambiguity in S 326(a)," the court 
interpreted S 326(a) according to its "plain meaning" and 
found that "[n]either property nor value is`moneys' within 
the meaning of the statute." Id. at *6. Consequently, the 
court concluded "that under a literal application of S 326(a) 
the value of a credit bid portion of a S 363(b) sale is not 
`moneys disbursed or turned over . . . to a party in interest,' 
and cannot be used to calculate the maximum allowable 
amount of trustee compensation." Id. Although the court 
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held that the plain language of the statute was sufficient to 
resolve the case, it also explained that the legislative history 
supported its interpretation of S 326(a). See id. at *8. With 
respect to the bankruptcy court's reasonableness 
assessment, the district court held that the bankruptcy 
court's consideration of the S 326(a) cap on trustee 
consideration was "erroneous as a matter of law." Id. at *9. 
The district court also concluded that the bankruptcy court 
improperly considered the potential hardship to the trustee 
and the lengthy period of time between the trustee'sfinal 
report and the U.S. Trustee's filing of its objections in 
determining reasonableness. See id. at *10. However, 
because "it [was] impossible to discern whether the 
bankruptcy court materially relied on these [three] factors," 
the district court simply instructed the bankruptcy court 
not to consider them on remand. Id. 
 
In this appeal, the trustee challenges both the district 
court's determination that the credit bid should not have 
been used to calculate the trustee's compensation and its 
conclusion that the bankruptcy court erred by considering 
the maximum percentages set forth in S 326(a), the 
procedural history of the case, and the potential hardship 
to the trustee in conducting its reasonableness assessment 
pursuant to S 330(a). The U.S. Trustee urges this court to 
uphold the district court's exclusion of the credit bid from 
the calculation of the maximum compensation award under 
S 326(a) and its conclusion that the reasonableness 
analysis should be limited to the factors enumerated in the 
statute. 
 
Because the district court sat as an appellate court 
reviewing an order of the bankruptcy court, we exercise 
plenary review of its decision. See Interface Group-Nev., Inc. 
v. TWA, Inc. (In re TWA, Inc.), 145 F.3d 124, 130 (3d Cir. 
1998). This court reviews the bankruptcy court'sfindings of 
fact for clear error and its conclusions of law under a 
plenary standard. See id. at 131; Precision Steel Shearing, 
Inc. v. Fremont Fin. Corp. (In re Visual Indus., Inc.), 57 F.3d 
321, 324 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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II. 
 
This court has not previously addressed the 
appropriateness of including the value of a credit bid in the 
base on which a trustee's compensation is calculated under 
11 U.S.C. S 326(a). The trustee argues that the amount of 
a credit bid should be included in the compensation base. 
According to the trustee, because the encumbered property 
was actually sold to First Fidelity and not simply 
abandoned or turned over, an exchange of value occurred 
which was sufficient to bring the transaction within the 
meaning of 11 U.S.C. S 326(a).5 The trustee further 
contends that there is no reason to distinguish between a 
credit bid sale to a secured creditor and a sale free and 
clear of liens to a third party and that distinguishing 
between the two transactions elevates form over substance. 
The trustee explains that the credit bid should be included 
in the base just as the entire sale price from a sale free and 
clear of liens to a third party is counted, including the 
amount used to pay off the liens. See Appellant's Reply Br. 
at 2.6 The U.S. Trustee responds that not only does the vast 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees, which filed an 
amicus curiae brief in this matter, similarly argues that the value of 
credit bid transactions should be included in the compensation base 
under S 326(a). The NABT points out that one of the definitions of 
"money" employed by the district court was"a measure of value," Amicus 
Br. at 5, and that an exchange of property certainly involves an 
exchange of value. Because this argument closely resembles those of the 
trustee, we examine it in the course of our discussion. We decline to 
address additional arguments raised by the NABT. See Kamen v. Kemper 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97 n.4 (1991) (stating that Court 
ordinarily 
does not address arguments raised only by amici curiae); Newark 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, N.J., 940 F.2d 792, 808 (3d Cir. 
1991) (indicating that court has discretion " `to determine the fact, 
extent, and manner of participation by the amicus' " (citation omitted)). 
6. The U.S. Trustee emphasizes the fact that in the certification 
requesting permission to sell the property the trustee indicated that 
selling the property would allow him to pursue a deficiency claim against 
the debtor's general partner, Antonio Reale. While it is true that the 
trustee so indicated, he also stated in the same document that he "ha[d] 
not made any decision as to whether [he] will bring th[e] [11 U.S.C. S 72] 
action" against Mr. Reale and that he would evaluate the claim "after the 
deficiency [was] determined and . . . after Mr. Reale's financial 
condition 
[was] re-evaluated." J.A. at 80-81. Further, because there is no 
information in the record regarding the reasons why the potential claims 
against Mr. Reale were abandoned, we have no basis for assessing this 
fact and consider it irrelevant to our analysis and decision. 
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majority of cases support the district court's strict 
interpretation of S 326(a) but also the interpretation 
complies with well-established canons of statutory 
construction and is supported by the legislative history of 
the statute. 
 
Sections 326(a) and 3307 of the Bankruptcy Code "control 
the determination of the amount of compensation to be 
awarded trustees appointed in a case under Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 11." In re Biskup, 236 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1999). Section 330 authorizes bankruptcy courts to 
award reasonable compensation to trustees. See Garb v. 
Marshall (In re Narragansett Clothing Co.), 210 B.R. 493, 
496 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1997). Section 330's allowance of 
reasonable compensation is subject to the maximum 
percentages set forth in S 326(a), which provides in full: 
 
       In a case under chapter 7 or 11, the court may allow 
       reasonable compensation under section 330 of this title 
       of the trustee for the trustee's services, payable after 
       the trustee renders such services, not to exceedfifteen 
       percent on the first $1,000 or less, six percent on any 
       amount in excess of $1,000 but not in excess of 
       $3,000, and three percent on any amount in excess of 
       $3,000, upon all moneys disbursed or turned over in 
       the case by the trustee to parties in interest, excluding 
       the debtor, but including holders of secured claims. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 326(a) (emphasis added). Courts have 
emphasized repeatedly that a trustee is not entitled to the 
maximum fee allowed under S 326(a); "[t]he maximum 
compensation allowable under S 326(a) is awarded to a . . . 
trustee only in cases in which the result obtained and the 
benefit realized by the estate are exemplary." Narragansett 
Clothing, 210 B.R. at 496; see also Biskup , 236 B.R. at 336 
("The language of S 326 is permissive rather than 
mandatory in that it fixes the maximum compensation of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Sections 326(a) and 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code were amended in 
1994. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, S 107, 
108 Stat. 4111; Pub. L. No. 103-394, S 224(b), 108 Stat. 4119, 4130. 
Because this case was commenced prior to October 22, 1994, however, 
the amended provisions do not apply. Accordingly, in this opinion we 
refer only to the pre-1994 amendment versions ofSS 326(a) and 330(a). 
 
                                10 
  
trustee, and it is not to be construed as an entitlement to 
the maximum fee specified."); In re Guyana Dev. Corp., 201 
B.R. 462, 474 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996) (same); H.R. R EP. NO. 
95-595, at 329 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6286 ("Section 330 authorizes compensation for services 
and reimbursement of expenses of officers of the estate. . . . 
[T]he compensation allowable under this section is subject 
to the maxima set out in section[ ] 326."). 
 
"It is axiomatic that our interpretation of any statute 
begins with the language of the statute." Director, Office of 
Workers' Comp. Programs v. Sun Ship, Inc., 150 F.3d 288, 
291 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). Having 
reviewed the language of S 326(a), we are inclined to agree 
with the district court that the value of a credit bid may not 
be included in a trustee's compensation base. However, we 
reach this conclusion for slightly different reasons than 
those articulated by the district court. 
 
Our primary area of concern with the district court's 
determination is its confident assertion that the language of 
S 326(a) is unambiguous. See Lan Assocs., 1998 WL 
467100, at *6. In this day and age when we exchange by a 
keystroke or series of keystrokes what we used to handle 
only in cash, we do not think that the term "moneys" is so 
clear as the district court indicated. In fact, one of the 
definitions cited by the district court refers to money as "a 
measure of value," see id. at *5 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INT'L DICTIONARY 1458 (1986)), which surely is a concept that 
evolves along with and is dependent upon changing 
cultural, social, and economic practices and institutions. 
For example, in today's society the term "money" could 
easily encompass the concept of credit, which increasing 
numbers of people use as a method of payment. The term 
"money" might also encompass property, especially when 
property is used as a method of payment or a measure of 
wealth. See WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 707 
(defining money as "[a] medium that can be exchanged for 
goods and services and is used as a measure of their values 
on the market" and as "[p]roperty and assets considered in 
terms of monetary value"); supra note 5 (describing the 
NABT's argument that an exchange of property involves an 
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exchange of value). But see In re Brigantine Beach Hotel 
Corp., 197 F.2d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 1952) (referring to pre- 
Code statute governing receiver compensation and stating 
that "[i]t is clear that the word `moneys' in the clause `. . . 
upon all moneys disbursed or turned over . . . ' is not the 
equivalent of property."). These reasonable interpretations 
of the term "moneys" render it ambiguous for purposes of 
our interpretation of S 326(a). See Taylor v. Continental 
Group Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 
1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1991) ("A term is ambiguous if it is 
subject to reasonable alternative interpretations."); accord 
United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1994) ("A 
statute is ambiguous if it reasonably can be read in more 
than one way."). 
 
Because we have concluded that the language of S 326(a) 
is ambiguous, "we look to legislative history to determine 
congressional intent." Sun Ship, Inc., 150 F.3d at 291 
(citing Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 642 
(1990)). In describing S 326(a), Congress stated in relevant 
part: 
 
       It should be noted that the base on which the 
       maximum fee is computed includes moneys turned 
       over to secured creditors, to cover the situation where 
       the trustee liquidates property subject to a lien and 
       distributes the proceeds. It does not cover cases in 
       which the trustee simply turns over the property to the 
       secured creditor, nor where the trustee abandons the 
       property and the secured creditor is permitted to 
       foreclose. 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 327 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6283-84. We think that a credit bid 
transaction is more analogous to the latter situation 
described in this passage, in which the trustee simply turns 
over or abandons the property to the secured creditor, than 
it is to the former, in which the trustee sells the property to 
a third party and then distributes the proceeds. Whether 
the secured creditor purchases the property through a 
credit bid or whether the property is turned over or 
abandoned to it by the trustee, the end result is the same-- 
in either case, the secured creditor receives the property in 
satisfaction of its secured claim. In contrast, when the 
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trustee sells the property free and clear of liens to a third 
party and then disburses the proceeds, the secured creditor 
receives a payment, presumably of money (cash or its 
equivalent), in satisfaction of its claim, which brings the 
transaction within the literal language of the statute. 
 
The legislative history also indicates that, in imposing the 
primary duty on the trustee to reduce property to money, 
Congress intended to distinguish between the concepts of 
property and money. See United States Trustee v. Messer (In 
re Pink Cadillac Assocs.), Nos. 96 CIV. 4571, 95-B-4243, 
1997 WL 164282, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997) ("The 
emphasis on `moneys,' rather than property or value, 
accords with the drafter's understanding that `[t]he 
trustee's principal duty is to collect and reduce to money 
property of the estate for which he serves.' " (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 95-595, at 379 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6335); see also Pritchard v. United 
States Trustee (In re England), 153 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 
1998) (citing 11 U.S.C. S 704(1) and stating that a narrow 
reading of S 326(a) harmonizes with the trustee's duty "to 
reduce the property of the bankrupt's estate to money"). 
 
In addition to analyzing what the secured creditor 
receives, our reading of the legislative history focuses on 
the role played by the trustee in the transaction. See In re 
Leedy Mortgage Co., 126 B.R. 907, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1991) ("The crucial issue in determining whether certain 
payments should be considered in the calculations[of 
trustee compensation] is whether the Trustee was himself 
actually engaged in the process of making disbursements to 
secured creditors, as opposed to a situation where sums 
paid to such creditors do not actually pass through the 
Trustee's hands."); cf. Pink Cadillac Assocs., 1997 WL 
164282, at *3 (stating that the legislative history of S 326(a) 
"shows that the statute was intended to cover distribution 
of proceeds after the sale of property" (emphasis added)). In 
this case, even though the trustee presumably participated 
in negotiating the credit bid sale, the trustee was not 
involved in disbursing anything to the secured creditors 
except for the property. Thus, the credit bid sale more 
closely resembles an abandonment or turning over of the 
property to the secured creditor than a sale to a third party. 
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Although we recognize that there may be cases in which the 
trustee's arrangement and negotiation of a credit bid 
transaction may prove to be as complex and time 
consuming as liquidating estate assets by selling them to 
third parties, cf. Southwestern Media, Inc. v. Rau, 708 F.2d 
419, 423 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting potential difficulty of 
administering encumbered estate assets), these difficulties 
do not change our analysis. 
 
Further, if Congress had chosen to include property or 
other consideration in the trustee's compensation base, it 
certainly knew how to do so. Under the section of the 
Bankruptcy Act which was replaced by S 326 in the 
Bankruptcy Code, trustees were compensated differently for 
"[n]ormal [a]dministration," 11 U.S.C. S 76(c)(1) (repealed 
1978) (cited in Collier on Bankruptcy App. Vol. A, Pt. 3(a) at 
3-41 (Lawrence P. King ed. in chief, 15th rev. ed. 1999), 
than for "[p]lans of [r]eorganization." Id. S 76(g). Although 
the provision describing the compensation for normal 
administration was substantially identical to the current 
version of S 326(a), S 76(g) compensated trustees based 
"upon all moneys disbursed or turned over . . . to any 
persons, . . . and where under the plan of reorganization 
any part of the consideration to be paid to unsecured 
creditors is other than money, upon the amount of the fair 
value of such consideration." Id. Congress' decision not to 
include such language in S 326(a) is indicative of its intent 
to limit trustee compensation to "moneys" in the strict 
sense of the word. 
 
For these reasons, we are satisfied that Congress did not 
intend to include credit bids in the trustee's compensation 
base. Stated differently, we think that Congress intended to 
limit trustee compensation to "moneys" in the narrow 
sense, i.e., in the sense of "sums of money,""something 
generally accepted as a medium of exchange," or "assets or 
compensation in the form of or readily convertible to cash." 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1458 (1986). 
 
A corollary of adopting a strict reading of S 326(a) is our 
rejection of the constructive disbursement theory. This 
theory allows a trustee to receive compensation for 
disbursements of property or other consideration which are 
deemed to be "moneys disbursed or turned over" under 
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S 326(a). Some courts have employed the constructive 
disbursement theory to increase the trustee's compensation 
base. See Southwestern Media, 708 F.2d at 423 ("[C]ourts 
have sometimes treated the sale of an encumbered asset as 
one that includes a constructive disbursement to the lien 
creditor, even as to the portion of the asset's value that 
does not actually enter the estate and is not distributed to 
the creditor by the trustee."); see, e.g., In re Greenley 
Energy Holdings of Pa., Inc., 102 B.R. 400, 405 (E.D. Pa. 
1989) (holding that funds from guaranteed contracts 
negotiated by trustee were "constructively disbursed to 
creditors and therefore [were] `turned over' to creditors" and 
"thus qualify as being money turned over to the estate upon 
which trustee's commissions may be based pursuant to 
section 326(a)"). In addition, a leading authority on 
bankruptcy law states that in a case of a credit bid sale, 
"the trustee is deemed to have constructively received and 
paid out the `proceeds' of the sale." See  3 Collier on 
Bankruptcy S 326.02[2][f] (citing Southwestern Media for the 
proposition that disbursements to secured creditors are 
included in trustee's compensation "even when the 
mortgagee bids on the property pursuant to section 363(k) 
and sets off its claim against the purchase price"). 
 
We are not persuaded by these authorities' adoption of 
the constructive disbursement theory for several reasons. 
First, because the constructive disbursement theory allows 
the trustee to be compensated for disbursements of 
property and other types of consideration, rather than 
simply for money disbursements as Congress defined them, 
it conflicts with our narrow interpretation ofS 326(a). 
 
Second, our conclusion regarding the scope of S 326(a) 
and our rejection of the constructive disbursement theory 
are consistent with a recent Fifth Circuit decision. In 
Pritchard v. United States Trustee (In re England), 153 F.3d 
232, the Chapter 7 trustee was charged with liquidating 
two jointly administered estates whose assets consisted 
primarily of real estate. Although the trustee successfully 
sold some of the property, he reached an agreement with 
the remaining creditors "to transfer the unsold real estate 
. . . to two of the creditors in full satisfaction of their 
claims." Id. at 234. Strictly construing the language of 
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S 326(a), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held that the trustee was not entitled to 
compensation on the transfers. See id. at 235-37. 
According to the court, "[t]he plain language of S 326(a) 
indicates that the statute caps a trustee's compensation 
based upon only the moneys disbursed, without any 
allowance for the property disbursed." Id. at 235. 
 
Third, the majority of district and bankruptcy court cases 
have limited the basis of a trustee's compensation to cash 
or its equivalent which the trustee actually disburses to 
parties in interest. See, e.g., In re Barnett, 133 B.R. 487, 
489-90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1991) (strictly interpreting 
S 326(a) and concluding that the value of a lien attached to 
property but not paid or disbursed by the trustee could not 
be included in trustee's compensation base); In re Music 
Merchandisers, Inc., 131 B.R. 377, 379-80 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. 1991) (stating that " `[m]oney' means currency or 
negotiable paper, not other forms of property" and 
confirming the rule that the amount of a lien in a sale of 
property subject to that lien is not included in the trustee's 
compensation base); In re North Am. Oil & Gas, Inc., 130 
B.R. 473, 480 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) ("Unliquidated 
assets simply `turned over' to the liquidating agent are not 
includable in the base, because only `moneys' turned over 
qualify for inclusion in the base." (footnote omitted)); 
Kandel v. Alexander Leasing Corp., 107 B.R. 548, 551 (N.D. 
Ohio 1988) (holding that value of money judgment was 
properly excluded from trustee's compensation base 
because no money actually passed through trustee's 
hands); In re New England Fish Co., 34 B.R. 899, 902 
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983) (concluding "that the trustee's 
compensation must be based on actual monies disbursed 
to parties in interest[ ] and not on assets or settlements 
which can be construed as a constructive disbursement"). 
But see In re Toole, 294 F. 975, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) 
(interpreting same language as construed in North Am. Oil 
& Gas and finding "moneys" broad enough to encompass 
securities disbursed). 
 
Our interpretation of S 326(a) and our resulting rejection 
of the constructive disbursement theory accord with general 
principles governing a trustee's duties in administering 
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estate assets. The trustee argues that he should receive 
compensation for administering the property even though it 
was fully encumbered and therefore of little value to the 
estate. The trustee claims that his negotiation of the credit 
bid sale benefitted the estate more than if he had simply 
abandoned the property to First Fidelity. According to the 
trustee, "the unsecured creditors would have received 
nothing . . . if the Property had simply been abandoned to 
[First Fidelity]." Appellant's Opening Br. at 3. 
 
As several courts have noted, " `[t]he crucial test [for 
whether a trustee is entitled to compensation] seems to be 
. . . whether or not the particular property or fund has been 
justifiably administered in the bankruptcy court, or 
whether or not the trustee has properly performed services 
in relation thereto.' " Southwestern Media, 708 F.2d at 423 
n.4 (quoting In re Schautz, 390 F.2d 797, 800 (2d Cir. 
1968)); see 3 Collier on BankruptcyS 326.02[2][f][ii]. In turn, 
whether a property or fund is justifiably administered 
depends on whether administering the asset benefits the 
general estate. Generally, if no estate benefit is anticipated, 
then the proper course of action is to abandon the property. 
See 11 U.S.C. S 554(a) (providing for abandonment of 
property "that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the 
estate"). Courts are in agreement that fully encumbered 
assets are unlikely to benefit the estate, and, therefore, 
such assets are not likely to be justifiably administered. See 
In re Stanley, 120 B.R. 409, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1990) 
("Several [c]ourts have addressed this issue and their 
holdings are uniform that the proper course for a Chapter 
7 Trustee to follow when presented with property of the 
estate in which there is either no equity or slight equity is 
to abandon the property."); In re Landreneau , 74 B.R. 12, 
13 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1987) (denying trustee's application to 
sell fully encumbered property by offset bid and stating that 
"[t]he Bankruptcy Code provides for the abandonment of 
those assets in which there is no significant equity for the 
estate. The trustee need not administer such assets."); In re 
Lambert Implement Co., 44 B.R. 860, 862 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
1984) (indicating that trustees should not engage in the 
" `sale of fully secured property where there is no potential 
equity for general creditors and . . . the trustee enhanc[es] 
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his compensation with no corresponding benefit to the 
general estate' " (citation omitted)). 
 
It follows from these principles that a trustee who 
expends time and effort administering fully encumbered 
assets should not receive compensation except to the extent 
that his actions provide an actual benefit to the estate. See 
Music Merchandisers, 131 B.R. at 378 ("One general rule 
seems to be that the base for calculation of compensation 
for a sale `subject to liens or encumbrances' excludes the 
amount of liens and includes only the net or surplus 
actually paid to (and presumably `disbursed or turned over' 
by) the trustee."); In re National Enter. Wire Co., 103 B.R. 
56, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Bankruptcy courts have 
generally taken the position that a trustee is not entitled to 
collect statutory commissions and expenses under Code 
SS 326 and 330 on the sale of fully secured property since 
the estate would not receive any proceeds to distribute to 
those creditors holding unsecured."); Landreneau, 74 B.R. 
at 13 ("The trustee . . . should be compensated[for 
administering fully encumbered assets] only to the extent 
his actions actually benefitted the secured creditor."); cf. 
Pink Cadillac Assocs., 1997 WL 164282, at *4 ("[C]ourts 
have found that a trustee may not count as `moneys 
disbursed or turned over' the proceeds of a sale of property 
that is fully encumbered or that has only slight equity, 
because the proper course is to abandon or turn over such 
property."); Barnett, 133 B.R. at 488 (noting that "trustees 
have been denied a statutory fee based upon the sale price 
of fully encumbered property or the sale of property 
enjoying only slight equity"). An additional reason for 
disallowing compensation for the sale of fully encumbered 
property is that "there is no justification for the estate, 
which is created for the benefit of the unsecured creditors, 
to bear the fee for the benefit of the secured creditor." In re 
Palm Beach Resort Properties Inc., 73 B.R. 323, 324 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1987); see also Stanley, 120 B.R. at 411 
(explaining that selling property in which there is no equity 
"would not result in any benefit to the unsecured creditors 
and on the contrary can in certain instances result in an 
actual detriment if the aggregate amount of a Chapter 7 
Trustee's commission from the sale of property with only 
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slight equity exceeds the paper equity that appears to 
exist"). 
 
In this case, we agree that the trustee may have achieved 
a benefit for the estate beyond what it would have received 
if he had simply abandoned the property to First Fidelity. 
However, the trustee will receive compensation based on 
the benefit he achieved for the estate. Not only do the 
principles outlined above dictate that the trustee should 
receive compensation for any actual benefit the trustee 
achieved for the estate but also the U.S. Trustee does not 
dispute that the compensation base should include this 
amount. See supra note 2 (indicating that neither U.S. 
Trustee nor district court disputes that the $372,387.00 in 
cash collateral which First Fidelity contributed to 
administrative costs and payment to the unsecured 
creditors may be counted as part of the trustee's 
compensation base (citing Lan Assocs., 1998 WL 467100, 
at *8 n.8; Appellee's Br. at 6 n.2)). Moreover, while there 
may be instances in which a trustee receives less 
compensation than he deserves when measured against the 
amount and complexity of work he performed, see 
Southwestern Media, 708 F.2d at 423 ("[T]he policy 
underlying the statutory provision allowing sale proceeds 
used to liquidate liens to be counted in determining the 
trustee's fee maximum . . . serves `the purpose of insuring 
to trustees compensation commensurate with the trustees' 
services.' "); cf. Stanley, 120 B.R. at 413 (stating that "a 
strict reading of 11 U.S.C. S 326(a) does not award 
compensation to the Trustee even though a disposition of 
the property may have required a great deal of the Trustee's 
time and effort"), the solution to the potential 
undercompensation of trustees lies with Congress. See 
England, 153 F.3d at 237 ("Congress's decision to set a 
maximum limit on trustee compensation based only upon 
moneys disbursed may arguably lead to a trustee receiving 
inadequate compensation in a particular case, but that is a 
problem for Congress to remedy."); Barnett , 133 B.R. at 489 
(noting the existence of meritorious arguments in favor of 
compensating trustee for constructive disbursements but 
stating that "the language of the statute can[not] bear their 
weight"); New England Fish, 34 B.R. at 902 (stating that 
"[e]ven though this may be a case where the trustee's 
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efforts deserve compensation in excess of the maximum 
allowable under the law, the solution is not with the Court 
but with Congress"). 
 
In conclusion, despite our disagreement with the district 
court regarding the ambiguity of the term "moneys," we are 
persuaded by the legislative history of S 326(a) and by the 
general policies underlying bankruptcy administration that 
Congress did not intend to include credit bids in the 
trustee's compensation base. In the context of a credit bid 
sale, a trustee's compensation must be based only on 
moneys actually disbursed or turned over to parties in 
interest, not on constructive disbursements. 
 
III. 
 
We now address whether the district court erred in 
concluding that the bankruptcy court considered improper 
factors in conducting its reasonableness analysis of the 
trustee's fee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 330(a). In this regard, 
the district court held that it was erroneous as a matter of 
law for the bankruptcy court to consider the following three 
factors: (1) the maximum cap on trustee fees contained in 
S 326(a); (2) the fact that the U.S. Trustee did not file any 
objection to the fee award until approximately two years 
after the trustee received it; and (3) the hardship to the 
trustee that would result from a disgorgement order. 
 
A. 
 
With respect to the bankruptcy court's consideration of 
the S 326(a) analysis, the trustee claims that the 
bankruptcy court did not confuse or erroneously combine 
the two analyses. According to the trustee, the bankruptcy 
court conducted a complete S 330(a) analysis independently 
from its determination of the trustee's maximum 
compensation under S 326(a). The U.S. Trustee contends 
that the district court was correct in instructing the 
bankruptcy court not to consider S 326(a) and that, 
because the trustee does not seek a holding thatS 326(a) 
should be considered as a factor in the reasonableness 
analysis, "he does not seek reversal of the District Court's 
decision on this point." Appellee's Br. at 53. As a result, the 
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U.S. Trustee requests that we affirm the district court's 
opinion in its entirety. 
 
We agree with the district court's determination that 
consideration of the maximum fees set forth in S 326(a) in 
the course of a S 330(a) reasonableness determination is 
erroneous as a matter of law. See Lan Assocs. , 1998 WL 
467100, at *9; see also Biskup, 236 B.R. at 336 (citing Lan. 
Assocs. for above proposition); cf. Gill v. Wittenburg (In re 
Financial Corp. of Am.), 114 B.R. 221, 224 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 
1990) (referring to trial court's possible "improper focus on 
Section 326(a) in determining fees" pursuant toS 330(a)). In 
determining compensation for trustees, a court begins by 
applying the criteria set forth in S 330(a). See Financial 
Corp. of Am., 114 B.R. at 223. The statute provides in 
pertinent part that a court may award a trustee "reasonable 
compensation for actual, necessary services rendered. . . 
based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such 
services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of 
comparable services other than in a case under this title." 
11 U.S.C. S 330(a)(1). Only after "reasonable fees are 
determined according to the . . . criteria[ ] [of S 330(a)] [are] 
a trustee's fees . . . cut down, if required, to the statutory 
maximum stated in Section 326(a)." Financial Corp. of Am., 
114 B.R. at 223. We agree with the Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel for the Ninth Circuit that "the provisions of Sections 
330(a) and 326(a) are independent of one another. Trustee 
fees should be set according to the Section 330 criteria, not 
merely according to the amount of moneys disbursed." Id. 
at 223-24 (citations omitted). As another court explained, if 
trustees' fees were to be computed according toS 326(a), 
"there would have been little need for Congress to have 
provided separate standards in 11 U.S.C. S 330(a) for 
calculating the amount of such stipends." In re Roco Corp., 
64 B.R. 499, 502 (D.R.I. 1986); see also In re Draina, 191 
B.R. 646, 648 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (referring to SS 326(a) 
and 330(a) as "two separate limitations" on trustee fees 
(emphasis added)). The legislative history accompanying 
S 326(a) confirms this view: 
 
       [Section 326(a)] simply fixes the maximum 
       compensation of a trustee. Proposed 11 U.S.C. S 330 
       authorizes and fixes the standard of compensation.. . . 
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       The limits in this section, together with the limitations 
       found in section 330, are to be applied as outer limits, 
       and not as grants or entitlements to the maximum fees 
       specified. 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 327, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6283. This passage indicates that while 
Congress intended S 330 to prescribe the standard 
pursuant to which trustee compensation is awarded, 
S 326(a) merely caps the fees awarded pursuant to S 330. 
Congress' description of the separate functions of the 
statutes demonstrates that a fee determination must 
involve independent consideration of each statute. 
 
In light of the legislative history and the cases described 
above, we conclude that the S 330(a) and theS 326(a) 
analyses must be conducted separately. Although it is 
difficult to tell whether or how the bankruptcy court relied 
on S 326(a) in assessing reasonableness underS 330(a), we 
affirm the district court's determination that the 
reasonableness determination under S 330(a) should not 
include consideration of the caps set forth in S 326(a). 
Thus, we instruct the bankruptcy court to considerS 326(a) 
independently of its reasonableness assessment under 
S 330(a) on remand. 
 
B. 
 
The trustee also argues that the district court incorrectly 
held that the bankruptcy court erred in considering both 
the U.S. Trustee's delay in objecting to the trustee's final 
report and the potential hardship to the trustee caused by 
a disgorgement order under S 330(a). Specifically, the 
trustee claims that because the factors set forth in S 330(a) 
are not all-inclusive, the bankruptcy court's apparent 
consideration of these factors was not erroneous. 
 
"In employing the fee setting criteria of Section 330(a), 
the bankruptcy judge is accorded wide discretion." 
Financial Corp. of Am., 114 B.R. at 224; see also In re C & 
A Enters., Inc., 132 B.R. 303, 307 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) 
("The bankruptcy court has the independent authority and 
responsibility to determine the reasonableness of 
compensation."). At least in part, the bankruptcy court's 
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broad discretion is due to the fact that "no matter how 
close the [c]ourt comes to an objective determination of a 
reasonable fee, [the fee determination] is still, in the final 
analysis, a substantially subjective exercise." In re Garland 
Corp., 8 B.R. 826, 831 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); see In re 
Gillett Holdings, Inc., 137 B.R. 475, 481 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1992) ("[T]he setting of fees . . . is an art, not a science."). 
 
Although many cases apply only the factors enumerated 
in S 330(a), our research has not revealed any case--apart 
from the district court opinion in this case--which has 
expressly stated that a bankruptcy court's reasonableness 
assessment is limited to only those factors. In fact, we have 
located two cases which have concluded that the factors set 
forth in S 330(a) are not exhaustive and that bankruptcy 
courts may consider relevant factors beyond those listed in 
the statute. See Roco Corp., 64 B.R. at 504 ("[T]he elements 
set out in 11 U.S.C. S 330(a) do not purport to be all- 
inclusive. Other guideposts can--and should--be 
considered where pertinent and appropriate."); Garland 
Corp., 8 B.R. at 829 ("The factors laid out in S 330 are not 
exhaustive, and the Court will consider a totality of factors 
in awarding fees."); 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy S 322 (1991) 
(same); cf. Greenley Energy, 102 B.R. at 406 (listing factors 
to consider as the results achieved by the trustee, the time 
spent, the intricacy of problems involved, the amount 
involved, and the opposition encountered). Moreover, in 
spite of the factors enumerated in S 330, many courts 
continue to employ the twelve factors set forth in Johnson 
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 
(5th Cir. 1974) (determining the reasonableness of 
attorneys' fees).8 See 3Collier on Bankruptcy S 330.04[3] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the 
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to 
perform 
the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the 
attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether 
the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client 
or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the 
undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; (12) awards in similar cases. See Johnson, 
488 F.2d at 717-19. 
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(stating that courts have relied on Johnson factors to assess 
the reasonableness of compensation under both the 
Bankruptcy Act and the Bankruptcy Code and that "[m]any 
courts continue to follow Johnson"); see, e.g., Garland 
Corp., 8 B.R. at 831 (employing twelve Johnson factors to 
determine trustee's fee under S 330(a)); cf. Grant v. George 
Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874, 877-78 (11th 
Cir. 1990) (considering Johnson factors in determining 
trustee's attorneys' fees pursuant to S 330(a)); First Nat'l 
Bank of Lea County v. Niccum (In re Permian Anchor Servs., 
Inc.), 649 F.2d 763, 768 (10th Cir. 1981) (adopting Johnson 
factors for purposes of determining attorneys' fees in 
bankruptcy cases); In re Malewicki, 142 B.R. 353, 355 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1992) (employing twelve Johnson factors to 
determine fee for Chapter 13 debtor's counsel pursuant to 
S 330(a)); Gillett Holdings, 137 B.R. at 481 & n.10 (Bankr. 
D. Colo. 1992) (assessing fees for debtor's investment 
banker based on Johnson reasonableness factors). Mindful 
of these cases and of the broad discretion bestowed on 
bankruptcy courts to determine appropriate trustee fees, we 
hold that the factors enumerated in section S 330(a) are not 
all-inclusive. 
 
The changes Congress made to S 330 pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 support our determination. 
The amended version of S 330 clearly indicates that in 
determining a reasonable fee, the court must "consider the 
nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking 
into account all relevant factors." 11 U.S.C. S 330(a)(3). 
While it appears that additional factors considered under 
the statute should pertain to the nature, extent, or value of 
the services, we think that this language clarifies Congress' 
intent that a reasonableness assessment need not be based 
solely on the statutorily enumerated factors. The fact that 
this intent was not clearly articulated in the prior version of 
S 330 does not preclude this interpretation. 
 
Even though we have held that S 330, even in its pre- 
1994 amendment form, does not present the court with an 
exhaustive list of factors to be considered, neither the 
procedural history of the case nor the potential hardship to 
the trustee seems to bear significantly on the actual 
services provided by the trustee. Accordingly, we think that 
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the relevance of these two factors mentioned by the 
bankruptcy court is questionable. Because neither we nor 
the district court can ascertain the extent to which the 
bankruptcy court relied on these factors, however, we 
merely instruct the bankruptcy court that although it need 
not necessarily limit its reasonableness assessment to the 
statutorily enumerated factors, it should consider on 
remand only those factors which are somehow pertinent to 
assessing the trustee's services.9 
 
IV. 
 
In conclusion, the trustee is not entitled to receive 
compensation on the amount of First Fidelity's credit bid. 
Additionally, the bankruptcy court should conduct its 
reasonableness assessment independently of the maximum 
percentages set forth in S 326(a) and should confine its 
S 330(a) analysis to factors which have some relevance to 
the services provided by the trustee. We therefore AFFIRM 
the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's fee 
award and REMAND to the bankruptcy court for a 
determination of the final trustee compensation award 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. For remand purposes, we take this opportunity to remind the 
bankruptcy court that while "each factor enumerated by S 330(a) retains 
independent significance," the factor examining the cost of comparable 
services "has an overarching role to act as a guide to the value of the 
services rendered given their nature and extent." In re Busy Beaver Bldg. 
Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 849 (3d Cir. 1994); see also In re Marvel 
Entertainment Group, Inc., 234 B.R. 21, (D. Del. 1999) (concluding, based 
on Busy Beaver, that "the appropriate market for determining reasonable 
[trustee] fees . . . depend[s] on the nature of the specific services . . 
. 
provided"). 
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